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Prologue, August 2002
Since this paper was written, economists at the U.S. International Trade
Commission have continued efforts to address the methodological and data
limitations identified in this paper by developing new approaches to estimate
the price effects of non-tariff barriers and identifying  more comprehensive
sources of data.  This ongoing work has been included in studies regarding
significant U.S. import restraints, which the Commission published in 1995,
1999, and most recently in 2002.  (See www.usitc.gov for full text versions of
these reports.)  In each study, the specific approaches used to estimate the
tariff or export tax equivalents of measures applied to trade in various
agricultural goods, textiles and apparel, other manufactured goods, and
services are fully discussed.  The reports also provide estimates of the
economy-wide and sectoral effects of the measures under examination.   1 Deardorff and Stern (1985, pp. 13-14).  See also Laird and Yeats (1990,
pp. 244-251).
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ESTIMATING TARIFF EQUIVALENTS OF NONTARIFF BARRIERS
Estimates of the costs of protection, for both policy makers and
economists who conduct applied commercial trade-policy research, depend on
reliable estimates of the price or quantity distortions caused by trade
barriers.  In the case of tariffs, the estimates are straightforward and
readily available; however, in the case of nontariff barriers, estimates of
the corresponding price or quantity distortions are difficult to construct
because of the lack of good data and often contain substantial methodological
flaws.  This paper provides a brief overview and critique of the methods used
by the governments of Canada and the United States in estimating tariff
equivalents of nontariff barriers (NTBs).  The first part gives a brief
overview of the measurement of NTBs with a specific focus on commonly used
methods for measuring tariff equivalents.  The second part provides a
comparison of the Canadian and U.S. applications of these methods. 
Definition and Measurement of Nontariff Barriers
The broadest definition of an NTB is any measure other than a tariff
that distorts trade.  NTBs generally are imposed to restrict trade.  In
addition, measures such as government procurement policies may affect trade by
altering the demand for particular products.  Moreover, government policies
that are not designed to explicitly limit trade (e.g., technical regulations
such as health and safety standards) may, in fact, limit imports from some
exporting countries.  UNCTAD's data base on trade control measures provides
the most comprehensive list of various types of NTBs.  The measures fall into
five broad categories:  quantitative restrictions; non-tariff charges;
government participation in trade and similar restrictive policies; customs
procedures and administrative policies; and technical barriers to trade.1     2 Recent econometric efforts are summarized in Council of Economic Advisors
(March 1994).  Recent studies using general equilibrium models to estimate the
effects of NTBs on the U.S. economy include:  U.S. International Trade
Commission (1993) and de Melo and Tarr (1992).  For a summary of earlier work
on selected NTBs, see de Melo and Tarr (1992, p. 9) and ITC (1993, p. 14). 
One example of research based on partial equilibrium methods is  Hufbauer and
Elliott (1994).
   3 See, for example, Laird and Yeats (1990) chapter 4. 
   4 One example of this approach are the survey results included in U.S.
Tariff Commission (1974).
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Various methods have been developed to estimate the economic effects of
NTBs.  Researchers have used a number of frequency measures to capture the
scope and potential effects of NTBs across countries and industries as well as
over time.  Researchers have also used econometric techniques and developed
various computational models (partial and general equilibrium) to estimate the
effects of NTBs.2   
A complete review of all of the issues associated with the estimation of
the economic effects of NTBs is beyond the scope of this paper.  Instead, the
following discussion focuses on the various methods used to measure the
effects of quantity restraints such as import quotas and voluntary export
restraints (VERs).  In particular, the following sections discuss the
classification of NTBs (i.e., the construction of various frequency measures),
the degree of restrictiveness of NTBs (i.e., whether or not the measures are
binding), and the estimation of the tariff equivalents of quantity restraints. 
Frequency measures
Frequency measures provide a means of capturing changes in government
trade policies and comparing trade policies on a country-by-country basis. 
Various studies have identified the number of NTBs imposed on a country by
country basis, and also have calculated the scope of coverage on a commodity
basis.3  Surveys have also been conducted to assess the impact of NTBs.4  More
recently, Erzan, Goto, and Holmes (1990) developed alternative measures to
evaluate the scope of the Multi-fiber Arrangement (MFA).  They constructed
scattergrams relating the share of textile and apparel imports subject to MFA   5 Erzan, Goto, and Holmes (1990, pp. 73-4).
   6 Some bilateral agreements also include aggregate or group quotas that
encompass a number of individual quota categories.
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quotas and the average quota utilization rates for various developing country
suppliers in the European Community (EC) versus the U.S. markets during 1981-
83 and 1985-87.  Generally, the figures show a corresponding increase in trade
coverage and quota utilization.5
One problem associated with these measures is that they may be subject
to aggregation bias.  For example, frequency measures calculated at a
relatively aggregated level, may understate coverage for a particular
industry.  Moreover, frequency measures generally provide little or no
information regarding the actual effect on import quantities, prices, or trade
flows. 
Restrictiveness of quantitative restraints
Generally, quantitative restraints such as import quotas and VERs are
considered binding when the utilization rate is high enough to effectively
inhibit foreign manufacturers from exporting additional production to the
importing country.  In theory, a quota or VER is not considered binding until
the utilization rate for the particular measure reaches 100 percent.  In other
words, import levels below 100 percent are the equivalent of what would
prevail under free-trade conditions.  However, this assumes that the
administration of the quantitative restraint is relatively transparent.  In
addition, uncertainty on the part of suppliers regarding the permanency of the
level of a particular restraint may also result in lower utilization rates. 
The administration of U.S. bilateral quotas under the multi-fiber arrangement
(MFA) provides evidence of these types of problems.
MFA quotas control the quantity of imports entering the United States on
a product (quota category) basis.6  In some instances, the quota applies only
to a subset of products that fall within the quota category.  In general, when   7 For example, the average quota utilization rate for India shifted from
less than 40 percent during 1981-83 to over 90 percent during 1985-87.  Erzan,
Goto, and Holmes (1990, p. 74).
   8 See, for example, Erzan, Goto, and Holmes (1990). 
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exports of products covered by a quota reach the quantity limit specified by
the agreement, no additional products can enter the United States.  However,
provisions in the bilateral agreements, which often allow for flexibility
through "swing," "carry-forward," and "carry-over" provisions, make the
systematic analysis of quota utilization difficult.
The extent of coverage and the degree to which quotas were utilized in
1991 varied significantly from country to country, as shown below.  
Number of quota Utilization rate greater than
categories covered or equal to:                       
Country1 by agreement 80 percent 90 percent 100 percent
   (number of quota categories)
Hong Kong 147 124  76 69
China 147 130 121 50
Taiwan 141 140 140  1
South Korea 141  85  69  0
Philippines 141  48  47 14      
  1 Top five MFA suppliers.
Source:  Department of Commerce and U.S. International Trade Commission
  
In addition, exporting countries' utilization rates may vary significantly
from year to year.7 
Recent studies have assumed that quotas are binding when utilization
rates reach 90 percent or greater.8  However, the level at which the quota is
assumed to be binding continues to be debated, in part because it is difficult
to measure the degree to which foreign exporters can take advantage of the
flexibility provisions in the agreements.  In some instances, foreign
suppliers may have sufficient information to utilize 100 percent of the
available quotas.  In other cases, current information on quota utilization   9 For example, Indian textile and apparel producers' ability (or lack
thereof) to effectively utilize available quotas is discussed in Kumar and
Khanna (1990).  Also, see discussion in Trela and Whalley (1990, p. 1193, fn.
7). 
   10 Given these uncertainties, the ITC (1993) estimated two sets of export
tax equivalents based on the assumption that MFA quotas were binding at
utilization rates of 80 percent or greater and 90 percent or greater.
   11 Fluctuations in demand may further complicate the estimation process.
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levels is not readily available.9  Thus, even though utilization rates for a
particular country's products may be well below 100 percent, suppliers may be
reluctant to commit additional resources to the production of goods for export
to quota-restricted markets.10 
Estimation of tariff or export tax equivalents
The use of partial or general equilibrium models to estimate the
economic effects of NTBs requires some measure of the price wedge generated by
the import restraint.  This measure is generally expressed as the tariff
equivalent of the import restraint.  In the case of an export restraint, the
measure is generally expressed as an export tax equivalent.
Estimates of tariff equivalents for NTBs may vary significantly as a
result of differences in estimation methods and the base years selected for
the estimates.11  In addition, efforts to estimate tariff equivalents of
specific import restraints are often hampered by data constraints and a lack
of information regarding market structure and conditions of competition in the
various country markets affected by the restraints.  The following sections
review various estimation methods and some of the limitations associated with
these techniques.  
Quantity measures
The quantity effect of NTBs can only be measured through the estimation
of what imports would amount to if the NTB had not been imposed.  One means of
estimating the effect is to simply extrapolate postquota trade patterns from a   12 Hypothetical imports can be estimated by assuming a constant growth rate
would have occurred or that the import market share would have remained the
same, absent the quota.  Estimations based on market share may vary
significantly, depending on the variable used as the basis for market share. 
See, ITC (1989a, p. 3-3).  The ITC (1989b), for example, estimated the
quantity effects of the quotas on U.S. steel imports and derived quota premia
from these estimates.  Also, see Morici and Megna (1983).
   13 These conditions include perfect substitution between the imported and
domestically-produced product and infinite supply elasticity of imports. 
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prequota time period.  However, this approach may produce biased results.12  
Researchers can also estimate what the volume of trade would have been
in the absence of the NTB by constructing models with price elasticities. 
This approach is difficult to utilize given the data requirements involved. 
Information regarding the structure of the industries involved is often
insufficient.  Moreover, the data required to estimate the parameters of the
model frequently are not available.  Finally, the data used in these
estimations must include periods in which trade was relatively unrestricted. 
Price measures
The price effect of a NTB is the difference between the market price of
the restricted product and the market price for the good that would have
prevailed were it not for the restraint.  This difference is generally
expressed as a percentage of the free-trade price (i.e., the tariff
equivalent).  If certain conditions hold, the hypothetical price for the
product would equal the prevailing world price (on a c.i.f. basis).13  The
conditions are rarely met.  
Frequently, the only available "pricing" data for imports and exports of
the products are unit values calculated on the basis of available value and
quantity data.  Moreover, the available data for imports, exports, and
domestically-produced products are reported under different classification
systems.  Even at relatively disaggregated levels, these classifications
frequently include different types of products.  In addition to differences
related to product classification, the imported and domestically-produced   14 Empirical work regarding quality upgrading includes:  Feenstra (1988)
and Cline (1987).  Laird and Yeats (1990, pp. 268-9, fn. 22) note that
governments in exporting countries often encourage this process.  One approach
suggested to deal with this issue would be to modify the modeling framework
used by representing  the import restraint as an upward sloping (rather than
vertical) line.  See, Martin and Suphachalasai (1990, pp. 58-9). 
   15 Sweden discontinued imposing quota restrictions on imports of textile
and apparel products in 1991.  However, it was not possible to use Swedish
import data as a proxy for undistorted world prices, in part, because the
Swedish Government does not report imports on a customs-value basis.  A
comparison of Swedish import data with U.S. import data would involve
estimating differences in insurance, freight, and other charges as well as
adjusting for product differences within each Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS)
subheading.  Currently, there is no reasonable way to adjust for these
differences.
   16 See, for example, Hamilton (1986, 1988) and Trela and Whalley (1990).
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products are often imperfect substitutes because of differences in quality
and/or the conditions of sale.  Differences in quality often are problematic
because the imposition of quantity restraints tends to encourage this
process.14  
In addition to the problems discussed above, estimating the price gap
resulting from quantitative restraints is difficult, to say the least, when
data on unrestricted world prices (or comparable third country prices) are
unavailable.  In some cases (e.g., textile and apparel products), the scope
and duration of the NTBs create trade distortions that affect world prices as
well as those of particular importing countries.15  In addition, foreign
country export prices are frequently not available.  Given these problems,
some studies have used quota license prices as a proxy for the price wedge.16 
The ITC used this approach to estimate export tax equivalents of U.S.
bilateral quotas for textile and apparel products, as described below.
Estimation of the export tax equivalents of MFA quotas
In the ITC's 1993 study regarding the effects of import restraints on
the U.S. economy, the export tax equivalents of MFA quotas were estimated
using quota license prices from Hong Kong.  The ITC estimated foreign country
export prices by using available quota license prices and U.S. import data   17 U.S. imports reported on the basis of customs value exclude insurance,
freight, and other charges.
   18 In earlier studies, prices for quotas traded in Taiwan were available. 
For example, Hamilton (1988) used Hong Kong and Taiwan quota prices to
estimate the effects of the MFA on U.S. imports from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and
South Korea.  Kumar and Khanna (1990) used quota prices collected through
surveys and, to a limited extent, from the Indian Government to estimate ad
valorem tariff equivalents faced by Indian exporters.
   19 Data on current quota prices are collected by the Hong Kong Trade and
Development Council.  The quota prices used in this analysis were collected by
private brokers and provided to Commission staff by International Business and
Economic Research Corporation. 
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reported on a customs value basis.  For products not restricted by
quantitative limits, the ITC assumed that U.S. import prices were roughly
equivalent to foreign country export prices.17  For products restricted by
quotas, the U.S. import price represents the foreign country export price plus
the quota rent (i.e., the value of the quota rights).  Assuming that the
prices of openly traded quotas reflect the value of the quota rents results in
the following:
 Pe = Pcv - QP (1)
where Pe is the foreign country export price, Pcv is the U.S. import price, and
QP is the quota price.  From this expression, the ITC calculated the estimated
tax equivalent (e) for a particular quota as follows: 
e = (Pcv / Pe) - 1. (2)
In the United States, MFA quotas are generally negotiated on a
bilateral, quota category basis.  The quota categories constitute a separate
import classification system that is based on fiber content and type of
product.  The allocation of quotas (i.e., export rights) is administered by
the respective foreign governments.  With the exception of Hong Kong, these
governments generally have not allowed quota holders to openly trade quotas.18 
Quota recipients in Hong Kong are able to trade quotas (or portions of quotas)
through private brokers.
In the ITC's analysis, average Hong Kong quota prices for 1991 were
calculated based on weekly quota prices for the entire year.19  These prices   20 See Trela and Whalley (1990). 
   21 Bilateral agreements frequently include group limits in addition to
restrictions on specific quota categories.  Quota categories falling under
binding group limits were classified as binding regardless of whether the
utilization rates for the particular quota categories were binding.  If the
utilization rate for a particular quota category exceeded that for the group,
it was classified according to the specific limit.
   22 For many countries, the bilateral agreements cover only selected items
in a particular quota category.  The remaining imports entering under these
categories are not subject to the quota levels imposed by the agreement.  In
addition, CBI countries are afforded special provisions for apparel products
made with U.S.-produced fabric.  Bilateral agreements with these countries
include guaranteed access levels (GALs) for selected products.  As a general
rule, the GALs are not binding and, therefore, are treated as nonquota trade. 





o equals the export price of the other exporter country, Wo equals the
labor cost for apparel in the other exporting country, Whk equals the labor
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were used to calculate the estimated export prices and ad valorem tariff
equivalents for the respective quota categories.  The available Hong Kong
quota prices were limited to apparel products.  Based on previous research, it
was assumed that the export tax equivalents for textile products amounted to
50 percent of the average export tax equivalent for apparel.20  Following this
approach, tariff equivalents were estimated for U.S. imports from Hong Kong
for each quota category in which the United States imported products in 1991. 
The import data were then aggregated to the ITC sector level.  Total trade-
weighted export values for each ITC sector were then calculated under the
assumption that the quotas were binding:  (1) when quota utilization rates
reached 80 percent and (2) when the utilization rates reached 90 percent.21
Export tax equivalents for U.S. imports from the remaining countries
subject to MFA quotas were estimated as follows.  For each country, the
portion of U.S. imports covered by the bilateral agreement was identified on a
quota category basis.22  The data were then aggregated to the ITC sector
level.  For each country, the Hong Kong estimated export price for the apparel
sector was adjusted to account for differences in wage and productivity
rates.23  The resulting value served as a proxy for the foreign country exportcost for apparel production in Hong Kong, goo represents the value of gross
output per worker for the other exporting country, gohk represents the value
of gross output per worker for Hong Kong, pe
hk equals the export price for Hong
Kong.  Labor cost data were drawn from data published by the U.S. Department
of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Werner International Management
Consultants, and United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)
(1993).




where e equals the estimated ad valorem export tax equivalent, Pcv
o represents
the customs value of the customs value unit price in the exporting country,
and Pe
o represents the estimated export price for the exporting country.
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price.  An estimated ad valorem tariff equivalent was calculated based on the
difference between the estimated foreign country export unit value and the
U.S. import unit value (measured on a customs value basis).24
The resulting export tax equivalent was then applied to the other ITC
sectors (with the export tax equivalent reduced by 50 percent for textile
product sectors).  This step yielded estimated export values for total imports
covered by quota agreements on an ITC sector basis.  The export values were
then adjusted on the basis of whether or not the quotas covering the
respective sectors were binding.  As with Hong Kong, total trade-weighted
export values for each ITC sector were calculated assuming that the quotas
were binding 1) at 80 percent and 2) at 90 percent.  For the remaining imports
not covered by quotas or covered by quotas that were not binding, the customs
value was assumed to be the equivalent of the foreign country export value.
The results of this step (estimated export values by ITC sector for each
country) for each scenario were then aggregated and added to customs value
data for U.S. imports from countries not covered by bilateral agreements. 
This step yielded estimated export values for total U.S. imports on an ITC
sector basis.  The result of this process allowed for the estimation of final
ad valorem equivalents for each ITC sector.   25 Krishna and Tan (1993) determined that, among other things,
concentration in license holdings had a significant effect on the equilibrium
time paths of quota license prices and quota utilization rates in Hong Kong. 
Earlier research by Krishna also examines the implications of imperfectly
competitive quota auction markets.  See, for example, Krishna (1990).    
   26 In addition, available data on wages differ significantly, depending on
the source.  Although productivity data collected by UNIDO are relative
comprehensive, the data are not available for all countries and are often
reported for different years.
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Limitations related to the use of quota license prices
The use of quota license prices as a proxy for the export price wedge
assumes that the quota license market is perfectly competitive.  Although the
quota license process administered by the Hong Kong government is relatively
open, allocation procedures favor existing suppliers.  Moreover, extreme
fluctuations in reported weekly license prices are largely unexplained. 
Recent research examining Hong Kong license prices for textile and apparel
quotas supports this anecdotal evidence.  Krishna and Tan (1993) developed an
econometric model to examine whether the Hong Kong quota license market was
perfectly competitive and concluded that there was sufficient evidence of
imperfect competition.25  They note that estimates of the price wedge based on
quota license prices are likely to be significantly overstated.
Deriving export tax equivalents for quotas imposed on third country
suppliers from estimated Hong Kong export prices also rests on assumptions
that may not conform to market reality.  Although quota categories are
relatively disaggregated, significant differences may exist across countries
in terms of product type and quality.  It is not clear that the wage and
productivity adjustments adequately account for these differences.26  There is
a clear need for additional empirical research to attempt to resolve these
issues.
     27 Lester and Morehen also provided some discussion on the protection
derived from contingent measures such as unfair-trade (e.g. antidumping) cases
and safeguard or escape-clause cases.  However, these are not reviewed in this
paper.  Lester and Morehen found the price protection provided by contingent
protection measures to be small in Canada and the United States.
   28 Tariff estimates were based on 1979, pre-Tokyo Round tariff rates while
valuation estimates were derived from the customs valuation system that was in
effect prior to 1985.  Canadian industries that received the greatest tariff
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Canadian and U.S. Measurements
Canadian Measurements
The most recent estimates of tariff equivalents for Canadian NTBs were
prepared by Canada's Department of Finance in 1988 in preparation for
negotiations of the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement.  These
estimates were reported in Moroz and Brown (1987) and Lester and Morehen
(1988).  Moroz and Brown reported estimates of tariffs and tariff valuations
as well as tariff equivalents for quantitative restrictions and for
preferential government procurement policies.  Lester and Morehen focused on
tariffs and tariff equivalents for quantitative restrictions and federal
procurement policies.27  Both papers relied primarily upon the traditional
methods for estimating tariff equivalents discussed in the first section
above, specifically: (1) the price-comparison method for many of the
quantitative restrictions and (2) the elasticity approach for government
procurement policies.
Moroz and Brown provided measurements of protection resulting from
Canadian tariffs, valuation, quantitative restrictions, and government
procurement at two levels of aggregation (26 and 92 sectors) for the Canadian
economy.  In addition, the authors reported two separate estimates of price
protection for both aggregations.  One set was for barriers affecting all
Canadian imports and the other was for barriers affecting imports from the
United States only.  The following discussion of Moroz and Brown's paper
focuses primarily on the estimates of tariff equivalents for quantitative
restrictions and government procurement policies.28protection in 1979 were the rubber, leather, textiles, clothing, and furniture
products sectors.
   29 See Moroz and Brown, table 11, p. 66.
   30 In the case of imports from the United States, only agricultural
products and footwear were affected by quantitative restrictions.  Differences
between the two sets of measures can be attributed to differences in the
composition of trade and to differences between the types of NTBs facing U.S.
imports and those facing imports from the rest of the world during the period
1980-85. 
   31 See table 11, p. 66 for Moroz and Brown's sources of tariff equivalents
for manufactured items.
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Moroz and Brown used measurements of quantitative restrictions for 12
commodities for the period 1980-1985 to construct the more disaggregated
measures (26 and 92 sectors) described above.29  The commodities included
eight agricultural products along with footwear, apparel, and automobiles from
Japan.  Two sets of tariff equivalents were also calculated for the 12
commodities, one reflecting barriers facing all Canadian imports and the other
reflecting barriers facing imports from the United States only.30 
The tariff equivalents for the restrictions on the agricultural products
were constructed, for the most part, by using the price comparison approach
described in the first section above.  Tariff equivalents for the manufactured
goods were obtained from a survey of the literature.31  For the agricultural
products, the tariff equivalents reflects the average for the period 1980-85. 
The five-year average was selected because of the volatility of agricultural
markets and prices.  The price comparison measurement used by Moroz and Brown
is depicted by the following ad-valorem tariff equivalent: 
        TE = Pc/Pw - (t+d+1)                        (3)
     where
    TE = the tariff equivalent of the quantitative restriction
 Pw,Pc  = world and domestic prices net of wholesale and retail trade
margins
     t = the tariff rate
     d = the rate for international transportation including
insurance   32 See Moroz and Brown, table D7, appendix D, p. 30 for further discussion
of the cost-push method.
   33 Tables 10 and D1 contain a single, aggregated tariff equivalent for
federal non-defense and provincial government procurement policies for 26 and
92 sectors, respectively.  Separate estimates at a 92-sector level of
aggregation were provided for federal non-defense, federal defense, and
provincial government policies in tables D2 through D4.
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In the cases of flour, feed, and live poultry, comparable price data
were not available to construct tariff equivalents.  However, the tariff
equivalents of two related products, namely grain and processed poultry
products, were constructed using the price comparison method.  Restrictions
are typically placed on related downstream and upstream products to maintain
the protection offered by initial quantitative restrictions.  Using the tariff
equivalents for these related products, the authors estimated tariff
equivalents for flour, feed, and live poultry using the cost-push method.32
Under the cost-push method, the input-cost data for flour and feed were
used to derive the price changes necessary to offset the higher cost of the
grain resulting from the NTB facing grain.  The tariff equivalent on live
poultry was obtained by using the tariff equivalent on processed poultry and
moving backwards through the cost of production to obtain the corresponding
price change.
Moroz and Brown also provide tariff equivalents of price distortions
resulting from Canadian non-defense government procurement policies based on
1981 data.  These included discriminatory policies by federal and provincial
governments designed to favor the purchase of Canadian products and
services.33  The basic elasticity method described in the first section was
used to estimate the tariff equivalents for preferential procurement policies. 
The tariff equivalent used by Moroz and Brown is depicted by the following
equation:   34 The U.S. estimates were obtained from a survey of the literature.
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 APMP - APMG   x (1+t)     TE =                                      (4)
     APMP         n   
where
     APMP =  the average propensity to import by the private sector
     APMG =  the average propensity to import by the government
        t =  the tariff rate
        n =  the elasticity of demand
To construct these tariff equivalents, Moroz and Brown assumed that, in
the absence of the procurement policies, government would purchase a similar
proportion of imports as the private sector; i.e., government and the private
sector would have the identical average propensities to import.  To obtain the
total protection afforded each sector, the tariff equivalents were weighted by
the government shares of total purchases in each sector, which were typically
small.  In most sectors, the share of federal nondefense and provincial
government purchases fell below 2.5 percent of total sector purchases. 
Overall, the incremental protection provided by government procurement
policies relative to Canadian tariffs and NTBs was found to be quite small;
specifically, the additional increase of import prices was less than one
percent in most cases.
Moroz and Brown also provide some information on the degree of
protection provided to 19 U.S. sectors by U.S. tariffs and NTBs covering the
period 1980-84.34  In general, the authors concluded that Canada did not
provide more protection through NTBs than other developed countries.  Although
Canadian tariffs were higher than U.S. tariffs, they also concluded that
Canada resorted less to quotas and bilateral export restraints.  Given the
trade barriers and subsidies in effect at the time of the report, Moroz and
Brown concluded that Canada provided more protection to its industries than
the United States but less protection than Japan and the European Community.   35 Tariff equivalents for quantitative restrictions reflect average 1980-85
estimates while those for government procurement policies reflect estimates
for 1981.  Moroz was cited as the source of these estimates.  Differences in
the measurements between both papers could possibly be attributed to the
slight difference in sectoring schemes and the difference in weights used in
constructing averages.
   36 See tables 2, C1 and C2 in Lester and Morehen. 
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Lester and Morehen provide estimates of Canadian tariffs and tariff
equivalents for NTBs using methods that are identical to those employed by
Moroz and Brown.  Indeed, the tariff equivalents for quantitative restrictions
and government procurement policies reported by Lester and Morehen appear to
come from the same database used by Moroz and Brown.35  In contrast to Moroz
and Brown, Lester and Morehen do not provide separate tariff equivalents for
NTBs facing all imports and for those facing imports from the United States
alone; however, they provide a more comprehensive look at measurements of NTBs
for the United States.36  The primary focus of the Lester-Morehen paper was a
comprehensive comparison of Canadian and U.S. trade barriers.
In brief, Lester and Morehen's conclusions were very similar to those of
Moroz and Brown.  The average rate of protection was similar in both countries
though somewhat higher in Canada:  6 percent in Canada and 5 percent in the
United States.  The price protection offered by preferential federal
procurement in both countries was minimal.  In general, industries that were
highly protected in Canada were highly protected in the United States as well.
In constructing their tariff equivalents of NTBs, the authors of these
two papers applied the three standard methods -- i.e., the price-comparison
method, the cost-push method, and the elasticity approach -- in a
straightforward and transparent manner and provided extensive information and
documentation on how each of these measures was calculated.  In evaluating the
methods used in these two papers, we rely primarily on the discussion in the
earlier section on "Definition and Measurement."  Each of the three methods
contains a number of shortcomings; notwithstanding, these are the methods that   37 See Laird and Yeats (1990) for further discussion.
   38 See Moroz and Brown, appendix D, p. 9, and Lester and Morehen, p. 26 for
further discussion.  The authors of both papers describe some of the
shortcomings in the tariff equivalents for procurement policies in more
detail.
   39 The tariff equivalents estimated by Roland-Holst, et. al, were based on
coverage ratios.
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are most commonly employed by researchers who examine applied commercial trade
policy, and they provide definite advantages over alternative estimates such
as "coverage-ratios" or frequency measures.37
Because the elasticity approach used in both papers contains some unique
features, it is worthwhile to briefly examine this application in more detail. 
The most notable feature of the elasticity approach in both papers is the
assumption that, in the absence of the procurement policies, the government
and private sectors would have the identical average propensities to import. 
One problem with this method is that not all of the differences in the average
propensities to import will be explained by the procurement policies. 
Furthermore, the reliability of the tariff equivalent will depend on factors
such as the existence of perfect substitutes and perfect competition. 
Finally, preferential government procurement may not change the overall level
of imports because the policies cover only part of the market and would induce
private-sector buyers to switch to imports.38  All of these factors would
cause estimates of the tariff equivalents to be highly overstated.
Finally, it should be noted that the estimates of tariff equivalents for
Canadian NTBs reported in these two papers are the most recent estimates
constructed by the Canadian Department of Finance.  In addition, with the
exception of Roland-Holst, Reinert, and Shiells (1992), other academic and
government researchers have not attempted to update Canadian tariff
equivalents.39 
    40 U.S. International Trade Commission (1993).
   41 The USITC study found that VERs for steel products and Japanese
automobiles were not binding in 1991 and, therefore, did not affect the U.S.
import price of these products.  The VERs for steel and machine tools are no
longer in existence.
   42 The tariff equivalent for the machine tool VERs was based on measures
constructed by Dinopolous and Kreinen (1991).
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U.S. Measurements
Because the first section of this paper presents an extensive
description of the different methods used in measuring NTBs, this part of the
paper provides only a brief discussion of the most recent estimates of tariff
equivalents for U.S. NTBs constructed by the U.S. government.  In addition,
this discussion provides some comparison in the methods employed by the
governments of Canada and the United States in constructing these tariff
equivalents.  The tariff equivalents of U.S. NTBs are presented in table 1. 
These estimates were constructed by the U.S International Trade Commission as
part of a standing request from the U.S. Trade Representative to provide
current estimates of the effects of significant U.S. import restraints every
two years.40  The set of estimates in table 1 are based on NTBs that were in
binding in 1991.
Similar to the Canadian economy, most of the significant NTBs in the
U.S. economy occurred in the textile and apparel sector and in the
agricultural sector.  Canadian and U.S. estimates of tariff equivalents for
agricultural products were based primarily on the price-comparison method. 
U.S tariff equivalents of the MFA quotas were constructed using the quota-
license method while Canadian estimates were taken from a survey of the
literature.  The only other significant NTB in the U.S. manufacturing sector
was the voluntary export restraint for machine tools.41  In this case, the
estimate was taken from a survey of the literature.42  The final tariff
equivalent reported in the ITC report measures the effects of the Merchant
Marine Act of 1920 (Jones Act) on the U.S. waterborne transportation sector.    43 Hufbauer and Elliott (1994) also provide a tariff equivalent of the
Jones Act.
   44 These results are summarized in U.S. International Trade Commission
(1993), table ES-1, page ix.
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To date, this is the one of few tariff equivalents estimated for a barrier
affecting trade in services.43
The ultimate purpose of these tariff-equivalent estimates was to measure
the costs to the U.S. economy resulting from significant U.S. import
restraints.  The tariff equivalents in table 1 were applied in various trade
liberalization experiments using a computable general equilibrium model.  To
briefly summarize these results, the liberalization of sectors with NTBs
produced the largest welfare gains for the economy.  The single largest gains
came from liberalizing the MFA quotas.44  
 
Conclusion
From this overview we can see that Canada and the United States
generally have used similar methods to construct tariff equivalents of NTBs. 
When directly estimating these tariff equivalents, both countries rely
primarily on the price-comparison method, especially for agricultural sectors
where good pricing data on domestic and world prices were available.  All of
these methods come with the attendant flaws discussed above; notwithstanding,
these are the methods most commonly accepted and applied by researchers.
There is an obvious need to conduct additional theoretical and empirical
research to separate the effects of NTBs from factors such as imperfect
substitution and market power that may also account for distortions in the
price of U.S. imports.  Moreover, there are a number of other theoretical and
empirical issues related to the estimation of the effects of NTBs that warrant    45 In particular, further development of models that account for product
differentiation, market power, and the dynamic effects of NTBs is desirable.
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additional research.45  Outlining the approach for such a task is a topic
beyond the scope of this paper and is left open for further discussion and
development. 21
Table 1
Significant U.S. import restraints, by sector, 1991
                                                                             
Average MFN Quota
Sector                             Tariff Rate
1 Premium
2           
                                            --------(Percent)--------
Textiles:
Broadwoven fabric mills ..... 12.5   8.5
Narrow fabric mills .......  7 . 4   3 . 4
Yarn mills and textile finishing.  8.9   5.1
Thread mills .......... 10.1   4.6
Floor coverings .........   5 . 9   2 . 8
Felt and textile goods, n.e.c. .  4.8   1.0
Lace and knit fabric goods . . . 13.2   3.8
Coated fabrics, not rubberized .  9.5   2.0
Tire cord and fabric ......  5 . 6   2 . 3
  Cordage and twine ........  4 . 5   3 . 1
Nonwoven fabric .........  3 . 5   0 . 1
Apparel and fabricated textile products:
Women's hosiery, except socks . . 15.7   5.4
Hosiery, n.e.c.. ........ 15.9   3.5
Apparel made from purchased
  materials ........... 16.9  16.8
Curtains and draperies ..... 12.1   5.9
House furnishings, n.e.c. ....  7 . 7   8 . 3
Textile bags ..........  7 . 1   5 . 9
Canvas and related products . . .  8.0   6.3
Pleating, stitching, trimmings,
  and schiffli embroidery ....  9 . 5   5 . 2
Fabricated textile products., 
  n.e.c. ............    4 . 1   9 . 2
Luggage ............. 15.7   2.6
Women's handbags and purses . . . 13.3   1.0
Machine tools ...........  4 . 3   0 . 2
Agricultural sectors:
Sugar ..............  0 . 7 124.8
Sugar-containing products ....  6 . 2  10.0
Butter .............  5 . 1  26.9
Cheese ............. 10.4  35.4
Dry/condensed milk products . . .  5.6  60.3
Cream ..............  3 . 7  60.3
Meat  ..............  1 . 9   6 . 5
Maritime transport (Jones Act) . .   (
3) 133.0
                                                                              
1 Ad valorem tariff rate, dutiable value basis, except for the MFA sectors,
which are concorded specifically for the ITC's CGE model.
2 Tariff or export tax equivalent quota premium rate.
3 Not applicable.
Source: U.S. International Trade Commission, The Economic Effects of
Significant U.S. Import Restraints, USITC pub. 2699, November 1993, Table 1,
p. 6.22
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